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VEIT BADER
TAKING RELIGIOUS PLURALISM SERIOUSLY. ARGUING FOR
AN INSTITUTIONAL TURN.
INTRODUCTION
ABSTRACT. Discussions of the relations between religions, society, politics, and the state
in recent political philosophy are characterized, firstly, by a strong US American bias
focusing on limitations of religious arguments in public debate. Even if the restriction or
radical exclusion of religious reasons from public debate has recently been extensively
criticized, secularist interpretations of liberal-democratic constitutions still prevail. Here
it is argued that both strong secularism and weak or “second order secularism” are coun-
terproductive for many reasons. Secondly, separationist interpretations of state-church
relations are predominant, even if the severe “wall of separation” is criticized more often
nowadays. Here it is argued that there are more and more interesting options than either
separationism or accommodationism, that we should not exclusively focus at the consti-
tutional relations between state and churches but address the full reciprocal relationship
between society, culture, politics, nation, state and (organized) religions, and that we need
more historical and comparative perspectives for the required institutionalist turn in po-
litical theory in order to overcome the obstacles inherent in predominant American po-
litical philosophy. The articles included in this volume are first, modest steps in this new
direction.
KEY WORDS: church –state relations, public reason, religious pluralism, secularism,
separationism, state neutrality
In most ‘Western’ countries from the 1950s on, the relationship between
religion and politics has not been at the center of political contestation.
Since the 1990s this situation has rapidly changed due to increasing reli-
gious diversity, particularly as a result of immigration (see Crouch, 2000,
pp. 255–282, for Europe) and to increasing internal and external threats
from religious fundamentalists of all varieties, particularly Protestant, Is-
lamist and Hinduist. Political theory and political philosophy have to ad-
dress the relations between religions, society, politics, and the state in a
new way but they seem not to be well prepared to do this appropriately.
Discussions in political philosophy, not astonishingly, show a strong US
American bias, because the US is among the least ‘secularized’ of all devel-
oped countries, because religion continued to have an enormous impact on
politics even under conditions of non-establishment often interpreted as strict
separation, and because of the legalist bias of predominant American po-
litical philosophy fed by a highly controversial and inconsistent Jurisdic-
tion by the Supreme Court. Debates in American political philosophy, not
VEIT BADER4
surprisingly, have been the most vivid and most influential ones, particu-
larly between defenders of political liberalism like Rawls, Audi, and their
critics. Recent American debates, however, are characterized by two fea-
tures limiting our abilities to find adequate answers to the new challenges:
(1) A focus on limitations of religious arguments in public debate and
political decision making and, (2) a predominantly legal discourse focus-
ing at the constitutional relationship between state and churches. In both
regards, mainstream liberal theories have increasingly been subjected to
withering attacks.
The more or less radical exclusion of religious reasons and arguments
from public debate and politics has extensively been criticized as morally
arbitrary, unfair, incompatible with freedoms of communication, and prac-
tically counterproductive.1 In the course of this debate it has become clearer
that moral principles often contradict each other (moral pluralism) and that
they are inherently underdetermined (indeterminacy of principles). Moral
pluralism – distinct from the ‘ethical’ pluralism of the Good – and inde-
terminacy imply acknowledging the fact that continuing and even deep
moral disagreement among reasonable people is the normal state of af-
fairs even with regard to constitutional essentials. Two consequences are
increasingly recognized:
(1) Moral judgment has to become more explicitly contextualized (Green-
awalt, 1995, 2000; Spinner-Halev, 2000; Galston, 2002). For theo-
ries of contextualized morality numbers matter, history matters,
constitutional and political contexts and consequences matter (Carens,
2000). The boundaries of free speech, for example, are drawn differ-
ently in the U.S., in Germany, and in India (Jacobsohn, 2000; Parekh,
2000) and such a differential evaluation may be morally permitted
or even required. In interpreting and applying the right to free exer-
cise of religion, to give a second example, the conflicting principles
of individual, associational and corporate autonomy may be balanced
differently in different cases, in different countries, with regard to dif-
ferent issues (Monsma and Soper, 1997; Robbers 2001; Bader, 2002).
(2) The clear recognition of indeterminacy, moral pluralism and continu-
ous moral disagreement has stimulated the post-Rawlsian shift towards
reasonable public deliberation and democratic decision-making. In the
1Waldron (1993), Greenawalt (1995), Fish (1997), Neal (1997), Eisenach (2000), Parekh
(2000, p. 304ff.), Shah (2000, p. 132–135), Spinner-Halev, (2000, p. 142ff.), Murphy
(2001), Rosenblum (2001) for many, see my earlier references in Bader (1999a, p. 617ff.).
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course of discussions of deliberative democracy, however, public rea-
son itself has been criticized: public reason does not result in con-
sensus, and reasonable reasons are not reasons we all ‘share’ or we
all can ‘agree’ with (they require a moderate threshold of accessibil-
ity: they should be understandable and intelligible); reasons should
not be reduced to arguments; public reason should be freed from
cognitivist, rationalist assumptions, allowing emotions as reasons;
homogeneous views of public reason have to be rejected and the plu-
rality or multiplicity of perspectives has to be explicitly recognized.2
Public reason, thus, has lost a lot of the expected appealing features
of purifying and homogenizing public debates steering reasonable
democratic decisions. The consequences of a broadened and pluralized
perspective on public reason for mutual understanding, decision mak-
ing and democratic legitimacy have not been clearly spelled out yet,
in my view, and the institutional requirements of public debate and
democratic decision making under ‘non-ideal’ conditions of structural
inequalities have not been adequately dealt with in general,3 nor with
respect to religious minorities in particular.
With regard to the second issue – the focus on the constitutional relation-
ship between state and churches – secularist interpretations of liberal
2Bhikhu Parekh has drawn seven important lessons from a detailed discussion of the
“logic of political discourse” (2000, pp. 304–313) resulting in a very concise and sharp
criticism of both Rawls’ and Habermas’ versions of public reason: “Political delibera-
tion, then, is contextual and culturally embedded, is never wholly cerebral or based on
arguments alone, and no single model of it fits all societies. Rawls’s theory of public rea-
son does not seem to appreciate these basic features of it. It has a rationalist bias, homog-
enizes and takes a one-dimensional view of public reason, assimilates the political to
judicial reason, and, unwittingly, universalizes the American practice, and that too in its
highly idealized version. In spite of all its strengths, even Habermas’s discourse ethic is
vulnerable on all three counts. He sets up a single model of political discourse and fails
to appreciate the depths of national diversity. Like Rawls, he too takes a narrowly ration-
alist view of it, stresses arguments and largely ignores other forms of reasons, takes a
homogenous view of political arguments, postulates a culturally unmediated or ‘pure
intersubjectivity’ and a language ‘purified’ of history, concentrates on ‘what’ is said and
ignores ‘who’ said it, and often comes close to assimilating political discourse to an ide-
alized model of philosophical discourse.” (p. 312f.). See for similar criticisms: Tully (1999,
2002, p. 3f), agonistic + negotiated, Valadez (1999), Williams (2000), Archard (2001), vd
Brinck (2002), Ferrara (2002).
3See for similar criticism: Parekh (2000, p. 306f.), Bader (2001a), Rosenblum (2001).
The available answers range from Parekh’s intercultural multi-logue to the astonishing re-
vival of Schmittian decisionism by Fish or Neal.
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democratic constitutions (see McConnell, 1992, p. 738ff.; Bader, 1999a,
pp. 609–612; Keane, 2000) and strict or formal neutrality as a guiding meta-
legal principle have been criticized (Smith, 1995; Bader, 1999) and pro-
posals have been made to replace them by “priority for democracy” (Bader,
1999a, pp. 612–619) and “relational neutrality”4 or “substantive neutral-
ity” (Laycock, 1990; McConnell, 1992, pp. 689, 719; Monsma, 1993;
Smith, 1995; W.L. Miller, 1998; Bader, 1999).
What is wrong with strict or formal neutrality? Critics have convinc-
ingly demonstrated that state-institutions and policies have not been neu-
tral with regard to religions both in a justificatory sense and in their direct
and indirect effects, and that attempts to present existing liberal states as
‘religion-blind’ only serve to hide religious majority bias from view. In
addition to such descriptive criticism they also have tried to show, much
more contested, that states cannot and that they need not be neutral in a
normative perspective: Religion-blindness is not only an unachievable but
also an undesirable ideal. To treat people fairly does not mean that we have
to abstract from all their cultural and religious particularities but to take
them into account in an evenhanded manner (Carens, 1997, 2000; Bader,
2002b).
What is wrong and misleading with secularist interpretations of lib-
eral democratic constitutions and the implicit or explicit conceptual iden-
tification of public with secular morality still predominant in political
theory? Three main clusters of arguments, in my view, are decisive:
(i) Secularist concepts seduce as to conceptualize “the justificatory non-
neutrality of liberal democracy in terms of secular versus religious
arguments or foundations. The main question is not, however, whether
arguments are secular or religious but whether they are compatible
with and/or support liberal democracy” (Bader, 1999, p. 612). If one
believes in the possibility and desirability of full justificatory neu-
trality of principles of political justice, constitutional essentials and
public morality, it should be obvious that such “political, not meta-
physical” arguments should be beyond any secular versus religious
split. In this regard, Rawls has already been careful to avoid the con-
4See similar approaches like Selznick (1992), Williams (2001) versus reproductions
of the old dichotomy between abstract universalism versus particularist relativism or his-
toricism by Alexander (1993), Fish (1997), Neal (1997) and Eisenach (2000): ‘all is’
politics, discretion, adhocery, rhetoric, prudence, partisan, partial, relative, contingent,
unpredictable.
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ceptual identification of public with secular in his “Political Liberal-
ism” and this has been spelled out in much more detail in “The Idea
of Public Reason Revisited” (1997, 1999, p. 147ff.). If one recognizes
more clearly than Rawls himself, that a political conception of jus-
tice cannot be strictly anti-perfectionist and neutral with regard to
competing conceptions of the good life and comprehensive moral or
religious theories (see Gutmann and Thompson, 1995, Tomasi, 2001
for many), that it is – and should be – incompatible with anti-liberal,
anti-democratic practices and fundamentalist theories, it becomes
even more important to spell out the precise character of these ex-
clusions. Liberal democratic principles and constitutions rest on lib-
eral-democratic culture and virtues,5 and theories and philosophies
compatible with them have to accept priority of democracy over con-
tested and competing truth-claims. Many ‘modern’ religions and the-
ologies do, and many secularist theories don’t. This minimally required
‘liberal-democratic perfectionism’ should be explicitly defended by
criticizing “moral, civic, and foundational integralism” to use Nancy
Rosenblum’s phrase. Bhikhu Parekh’s perfectionist defense of the
‘public’ or “political function” of religions (2000, p. 329) is much
stronger and, for this reason alone, much more contested than more
minimalist defenses and justice-based theories (see Bauböck’s cri-
tique, 2001, p. 110, 112). Let me explain a bit:
(1) Arguing that strong secularism is unfair is one thing, but saying
that strong secularism would include that “secular citizens are able
to lead whole and integrated lives” is clearly another thing. This claim
is untenable because secular citizens themselves also may hold more
comprehensive ‘secular’ moral theories, conceptions of a good life,
etc. The whole idea that citizens could lead whole and integrated lives
in modern societies, and that public or political debate would be con-
ducive to something like this is, in my view, at odds with any con-
ceivable version of political deliberation in modern, differentiated
and culturally deeply diverse state-societies.
(2) Parekh repeats earlier claims6 that religion “provides a valuable
counterweight to the state, nurturing sensibilities and values the lat-
ter ignores or suppresses”, “it provides an alternative source of mo-
5See Rosenblum (1998) and Bader (2002) for a fairly minimalist interpretation of this
requirement.
6See 1996 PSI, 1998. See my critical remarks in 1999, p. 615f.
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rality and allegiance” against the state that “has traditionally claimed
to monopolize morality”; and that religion can correct the tendency
of modern social and political life “to encourage a quasi-utilitarian
attitude to morality” (p. 328). These claims are more moderate now
but still too strong: (a) modern states need not, and obviously should
not, ‘monopolize’ morality, and “modern social and political life”
does not – in itself – encourage utilitarianism or cynicism; (b) vice
versa, ‘religion’ does not indiscriminately all the good and benefi-
cial things Parekh claims (e.g. 1998, p. 80 “religion is society’s
conscience and moral sentinel”). (c) It should be spelled out more
explicitly that there are good ‘secular’ foundations of morality in
general, and of public, liberal-democratic morality in particular,
which are as objective as we can have it and surely not weaker than
religious foundations. In a personal communication – responding to
my critical remarks in 1999, p. 614ff. – Parekh explained that it is
not his considered view that secularism (and as I take it, the modern
state and modern life) would lead to cynicism, to subjectivism and
relativism, to “privatization and relativization of morality to which
liberal societies are particularly prone”, to “haughty self-assurance
of the rationalist modernity” (p. 330), to weak morality etc. but this
is still not explicitly rejected.
(3) Religion also is supposed to provide a “valuable counterweight”
in another regard as “powerful non-statal institutions to check the
state” (p. 328) and against the fact that “the modern state is abstracted
from society and tends to become bureaucratic and remote. While
this has enabled it to rise above social, ethnic, religious and other
divisions and institutionalize such great values as equality before the
law, liberty and common citizenship, it has also been the source of
many of its weaknesses” (p. 329). The state is ‘shallower’, external
to society, “incapable of nurturing the moral life of the community”.
This challenge, compared with earlier versions, is again more mod-
erate (any link to discussions of ‘establishment’ are cut), and much
nearer to Associative Democracy. Still, it raises three concerns: (a) I
agree with Paul Hirst and others, that this thin state and this thin public
morality need not be as weak as is supposed by so many critics; (b)
If one applies my concepts of “relational neutrality” and “fairness as
evenhandedness”, the social, democratic, constitutional state and
public morality need not be as thin as strong liberal anti-perfection-
ists hold. (c) Most importantly: too much “liberal-democratic expect-
ancy” is implied in these hopeful assumptions. Nancy Rosenblum has
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made quite clear, that we always have to spell out: Which religions?
Which associations? instead of claiming that “along with the family,
schools, voluntary associations and other social institutions religion
plays an important part in sustaining the deeper springs of morality”
(p. 329).
(4) Religion “stresses the unity of the human species and challenges
the tendency to limit morality to the territorial boundaries of the state”
(p. 330, see earlier 1998, p. 69 for “global civil society”). Again, this
may be true of some universalist salvation religions sometimes.7 But
in my view it is urgent (a) to stop talking about religion in general,
because Parekh himself clearly recognizes “that religion has often
supported aggressive nationalism and horrendous wars” (p. 328), and
(b) to recognize that the tension between universalism (of the few
universalist religions) and particularist civil religions is deeper and
less easily resolvable than Parekh seems to assume.
(5) Religion “rejects the claims of the state and the economy to be
governed by their own narrow values and subordinates them to wider
moral concerns” (p. 329). Depending upon how strong such ‘rejec-
tion’ and ‘subordination’ is thought to be, this is clearly a very mixed
blessing. I would agree that some versions of the praise of “functional
differentiation” of modern societies may go too far,8 but any idea of
religion or morality as the center of modern societies is clearly in-
compatible with the most minimal version of ‘separationism’ and the
most minimal version of ‘secularization’.
(ii) Secularist interpretations “neglect the possibility and existence of
principled religious or theological foundations of liberal democracy”
(Bader 1999, p. 612). Focusing at the Christian tradition only, from
the Reformation onwards churches, denominations and the respec-
tive theologians had to come to terms with internal religious diver-
sity, with the modern state and with developing liberal-democratic
constitutions in a new way. In a first step, they learned to see peace,
stability and public order not only as strategic or purely prudential
values but as moral ones. In order to make religion peaceable authors
like Hugo Grotius, Manfred Frank, and Coornhert started to replace
“dogma and creed with a morality oriented to social peace” (Shah,
7See my hesitations (1999), note 52 versus Jose Casanova.
8See my criticism of Luhmann in this regard (Bader, 2001).
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2000, p. 125ff.; Galston, 2002, p. 24ff.). Learning the priority of
toleration and a minimal, universalist notion of respect started to tame
fundamentalist theological doctrines and also opened up a way to
reformulate parochialist, dogmatic and sectarian conceptions of Chris-
tianity as a more universalist Christian ethics, but it did not include
priority for liberal-democracy. This only happened in a second step:
different protestant denominations (Quakers, Baptists, Separatists and
so on, but also Remonstranten, Rekkelijken, Unitarians (see Handy,
1976, p. 199ff.; Israel, 1995) started to develop conceptions of reli-
gion in which liberal democracy explicitly gains priority over denomi-
national truths when it comes to political decision-making. Protestant
religions are made compatible with liberal democracy from the in-
side by Madison and many others (see Miller, 1985; Thieman, 1996;
Eisenach, 2000). Much later – and still shakier – Catholicism learned
the same lesson (Murray, 2. Vatican Concilium, see also Casanova,
1994; Kalyvas, 1996). This may be interpreted as a “flattening of
genuine pluralism” (Shah, 2000, p. 129), it has been heavily contested
by earnest Calvinist reformers from the 17th Century on and by Jesu-
its. It surely means a “liberalization of religion”, may be even a
“Protestantization of Catholicism”, and of Lutheranism (Handy, 1976,
p. 211; Herberg and Miller, 1985, p. 274) from the inside, but it is
certainly mis-described as “secularization of religion” (as Kalyvas
amongst many others contents: pp. 241–264). From then on, it is
clearly misleading and unfair to neglect or exclude these principled
‘foundations’ of liberal democracy,9 as the secularism terminology in-
evitably does.
9McConnell’s four theoretical responses amongst political theorists to the problem of
citizenship ambiguity are instructive here: (1) Religion is seen as disruptive (Rousseau):
state has to crush religions not reinforcing the dogmas of the state, replacing them by
civil religion; (2) Madison “maintained that religious obligation takes precedence” (2000,
p. 93, 95f.): liberal anti-majoritarianism; (3) Locke, Jefferson and others “assume that
civil society is unaffected by the moral and even the theological teachings of its major
religions” (p. 96): separationism. (4) Washington, de Tocqueville and others assume a
‘salutory’ or “happy accommodationism” (p. 97ff., see Miller, 1985, p. 244 for Washing-
ton, see also Spinner-Halev, 2000, p. 87ff.): neither separationist nor majoritarian, but
“seedbed of virtues”. Clearly position (2) assumes liberalized religions and position (4)
assumes internally democratized religions.
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(iii) Secularist interpretations direct “our criticism of fundamentalism in
politics in a one-sided and myopic manner against religious funda-
mentalism and thus tend to neglect all secular fundamentalisms even
if they pose much more dangerous threats to tolerance and liberal de-
mocracy” (Bader 1999, p. 612, Miller 1985, p. 347f., McConnell
1992, p. 741; Wolterstorff 1997).
If all this would be clearly recognized, it should also be seen that it is not
enough to criticize “strong secularism”, as most political theorists, think-
ing seriously about this issue, do. It would also be necessary to explicitly
criticize “second order secularism” (Phillips, 1996, p. 27f.; Keane, 2000;
Rosenblum, 2000, pp. 15, 18), ‘weak’ or “inclusive and religiously sensi-
tive secularism” (Parekh, 2000, p. 335), “moderate secularism” (Modood,
2001) or “political secularism” (Bielefeld, 2001). Even if it would turn
out to be only a terminological question, which I myself very much doubt
– behind second order secularism a lot of aggressive liberal and human-
ist first order secularism tends to hide –, continuing ‘secularism-talk’ in-
volves two serious disadvantages: a lack of conceptual and theoretical
clarity and, more important, serious strategic disadvantages. In countries
like India or Turkey, the presentation of liberal-democratic constitutions
and public morality as ‘secular’ actually turned out to be completely
counterproductive reinforcing the fundamentalization of both Hinduism
and Islam. In predominantly Christian countries, aggressive liberal secular-
ism, particularly in education, has produced religious counter-mobilization
in the 19th Century (see Kalyvas), and promoting public as ‘secular’ edu-
cation nowadays looks very similar, particularly from the perspective of
Muslim immigrants.10 The Protestant or Catholic Christian Parties in many
European countries, emerging as a response to aggressive liberal secularism
have been confronted with a strategic “confessional dilemma” (Kalyvas,
p. 241). In describing this dilemma, however, and in analyzing whether it
has not been self-defeating, secularism-terminology is misleading. Chris-
tian Democratic parties had to accept the rules of the game, and such
liberalization and democratization (a distinct and much later process!)
surely meant ‘declericalization’ (p. 242) and also ‘desacralization’ (p. 245)
of religion but this is – contrary to Ross, Kalyvas and many others – dif-
10See for England (Nielsen, 1986) (see Grillo, 1998, p. 207–212; Bader, 2000, p. 18f.;
Rath et al., p. 226ff.). See for the Protestant character of American Public schools (Handy,
1976, p. 179ff. 218; Miller, 1985, p. 261ff.; Eisenach).
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ferent from ‘secularization’. They need not “choose between secular-
ism and sectarianism”, they could retain a confessional character by
relaxing or breaking their dependence on the churches and by developing
less doctrinal, sectarian, more universalist conceptions of Christian or, even-
tually, even humanist or ‘Western’ civilization and values.
In response to such criticism, the hard core of a liberal understanding
of the church-state relationship is getting ever more minimalist: something
like ‘voluntarism’ and “separationism minimally understood” (Eisenach,
2000, p. 135; Rosenblum, 2000, pp. 179–183; Shah, 2000, p. 137). Vol-
untarism, then, should not be identified “with the ‘protestant’ formula that
prescribes how people come to have ‘beliefs that save’” (Rosenblum, 2000,
p. 9). Also, entering and remaining in religious associations are only rarely
‘free’ and voluntary. Most people are either born into or raised in religious
communities, and this ‘involuntary’ membership may be constitutive for
their practices and self-definitions (Eisenberg, 1995; Warren, 2000;
Weinstock, 2002; Bader, 2003). “Membership in religious groups may not
be best described as consensual and a matter of unfettered individual choice
… it may be ascriptive or characterized as an imperative. Voluntarism
means, instead, that membership is not determined by public law, and that
religious associations are constrained from exercising coercive political
authority over their members and outsiders.” (Rosenblum, 2000, p. 9) In
discussing the “minimum of separationism” it is increasingly acknowl-
edged that ‘separation’ has never been absolute, that the ‘wall’ is perme-
able and moveable, that it shifts all the time, and that separationism in the
United States – and certainly in the predominant ideology in the United
States – is “severe” (Rosenblum, p. 10) compared with other constitutions
in liberal democratic countries which “do not all aim at privatization.
Democratic states may extend legal recognition and public support to a
plurality of religions. They may subsidize religious activities in areas
such as education and cede jurisdiction to religious authorities in the
domain of personal law” (p. 11). If voluntarism and separationism are
still to be conceived as “standard elements of liberal democratic theory”,
as Rosenblum thinks, it has to be assessed where they provide “a sure
guide, where they are taxed, and what alternative resources are avail-
able” (p. 11).
The recognition that things are done differently in other liberal demo-
cratic countries almost inevitably implies that the exclusively legal dis-
course, particularly the focus on the contested jurisprudence of the two
Religion Clauses by the American Supreme Court, is weakening and that
a plea for a more multi-disciplinary approach in a more comparative per-
spective can be heard (Marquand and Nettler, 2000; Rosenblum, 2000).11
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This, however, is not acknowledged by predominant liberal political phi-
losophers as is shown, for instance, by their complete neglect of the semi-
nal study “The Challenge of Pluralism. Church and State in Five
Democracies” by Monsma and Soper (1997). In their comparison of the
U.S., the Netherlands, Australia, England, and Germany, they demonstrate
that (a) religious freedoms are interpreted differently: predominant strict
separationism in the U.S. - particularly in primary and secondary educa-
tion – stresses negative freedoms and non-intervention, whereas most other
countries – constitutionally most outspoken the Netherlands (p. 64f., 81)
and Germany (p. 165ff.) – try to find more sensible balances between nega-
tive and positive freedoms. (b) Contrary to widespread expectations, the
actual guarantee of free exercise by constitutional provision does not al-
ways protect religious minorities (p. 202 for Australia and the U.S.) when
popular sentiment and the elected branches of government fail to do so.
(c) Again contrary to widespread expectations, strict separationism in pri-
mary and secondary education has a secularist bias tending to violate re-
lational state-neutrality (p. 32ff.). All other countries – particularly the
Netherlands (p. 67ff.) and Germany (p. 178) – have recognized this and
provide subsidies on a more or less equal footing to private schools (e.g.
Australia: p. 102ff.). (d) Regarding welfare services in the U.S. one sees
– compared to education – an “almost complete about-face, finding many
forms of cooperation and support to be constitutional” (p. 36). Coopera-
tion and support are characteristic, in a much more consistent way, for the
Netherlands and Germany, and also, in a more pragmatic way, for Aus-
tralia.
Political philosophy, then, has to confront the fact that liberal princi-
ples like religious freedom are interpreted differently in different his-
torical periods and countries (under-determinacy of principles), that the
inevitable balancing with conflicting principles like equal treatment, non-
discrimination is done differently (moral pluralism), and that the institutional
regulation and practice of the relationship between state and (organized)
11Sociological approaches do not restrict the analysis to church - state relations (see
Demerath and Williams, 1987; Robertson, 1987; Rooden, 1996) and criticize the paro-
chialism of mainstream political philosophy by pointing out a double bias implicit in
church-state debates: (i) the notion of “the church” – a hierarchically organized institu-
tion claiming jurisdiction as a special variety of “structural distinctiveness” is absent in
the Islamic, Hinduist and also in the Buddhist tradition; (ii) it presupposes some version
of a ‘modern’, ‘Western’ state. Consequently, the specific variety of tensions between
(organized) religions and politics, the church-state tensions, are absent from these other
traditions (see short: Robertson, 1987, pp. 153–160).
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religions shows a huge variety of competing institutional models (see Rob-
bers, 1995, 2001).
All these developments in response to criticism of political liberalism
should, in my view, be applauded. Still, I see the following obstacles block-
ing the elaboration of an empirically more adequate and morally more sat-
isfying political theory of the complex relationship between religions and
societies, cultures, politics, nations, states.
(i) In political philosophy, it still looks as if there would be only two
options really making a difference: ‘accommodationism’ or “struc-
tural pluralism” on the one hand, and ‘separationism’ or “civil liber-
tarian liberalism” on the other hand (McConnell, 2000, p. 100ff.;
Rosenblum, 2000, pp. 179–183). And it looks as if these two camps
could be easily associated with traditional political dichotomies of
Right/Left or Conservative/Progressive. There are more, and more
interesting options, a fact already indicated by Monsma and Soper
(1997). And clearly not only liberal Protestant believers like Steven
Smith, Thiemann, Wolterstorff, Greenawalt, or liberal Catholics like
Perry, Glendon, Novak, Neuhaus, Weigel (following Murray), not
only orthodox Protestants or Catholics (like Schindler), conservation-
ists or perfectionists, not only the religious Right or traditionalist
leaders of ethno-religious minorities are defending varieties of reli-
gious accommodation but also egalitarian defenders of democratic
institutional pluralism like myself. It is “no accident that pragmatists,
civic republicans, anti-foundationalists, historicists and post-modern-
ists in academia” substantially agree with “religious evangelicals,
liberal nationalists, and pluralist communitarians in attacking prevail-
ing church-state jurisprudence” (Eisenach, 2000, pp. 111, 115). The
common critical core of this unholy coalition of strange bedfellows
directly evaporates, however, if one looks more closely. Their criti-
cal diagnosis is not the same (e.g. nostalgic neo-conservative diagno-
sis of ‘modernity’ versus justice-based criticism) and their institutional
and policy alternatives differ widely, ranging from neo-Hobbesian or
Schmittian decisionism (Stanley Fish, Neal Alexander, and others)
via Rortian ironic tribalism to Benjamin Barber’s and Hilary Putnam’s
non-ironic democratic pragmatism to my own minimalist defense of
Priority for Democracy.12
12Bader (1999), note 70, Bader (1997) for modest conceptions of intercultural dialogue,
of learning in history, of minimalist universalism etc. See similar Tully (1995), Shah (2000).
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(ii) The debate is still too much focused on the state-church relationship
instead of addressing the full, reciprocal relationships between soci-
ety – culture – politics – nation – state and (organized) religions.
(iii) The “conceptual and theoretical resources” available in liberal demo-
cratic theory (Rosenblum, 2000, p. 11) are still not differentiated
enough to adequately describe, explain and normatively evaluate the
complexity of the empirical relationships or to design institutional al-
ternatives more adequate for religiously deeply diverse societies.
(iv) Contextualized morality stimulates a historical and comparative per-
spective and the required institutionalist turn in political theory de-
mands to analyze not only principles, but also rights, institutions,
cultures and practices of judgment and action, to pay more attention
to practical knowledge and common sense (McConnell, 1992, p. 694)
instead of an exclusive focus on abstract, generalizable theoretical
knowledge so typical for mainstream liberal political philosophy (see
Bader and Engelen, 2001i).13
As already indicated, such a shift towards a more contextualized politi-
cal philosophy is argued for – with regard to state-religion issues – by
Greenawalt, Spinner-Halev, Rosenblum, Parekh, Galston and others. It is
part of a broader contextualizing shift in moral and political philosophy
in which the consequences of moral pluralism and of under-determinacy
of principles are really taken seriously, and consequent attempts have been
made to overcome the “terrible lack of institutional concreteness” (Unger,
1983) so characteristic of mainstream political philosophy. Contextualized
theories of responsive law (Selznick, Unger), of complex equality and
affirmative action (Williams, Bader), of just wars (Walzer), of fair immi-
gration and incorporation (Carens, Kymlicka, Bauböck) are not only called
for but also elaborated during the last decade. Contextualized theories of
morality and a new political philosophy “in the vernacular” (Kymlicka,
2001) are promising to overcome the misleading choice between insensi-
tive universalism and ruthless particularism. Contextualized theories ex-
plicitly open the space for discussions of divergent, but morally equally
legitimate institutions and policies. They have to avoid two obvious dan-
13Compared with the U.S., debates in England (PSI, 1996), in the Netherlands or in
Australia are less focused on principles only, and less caught in legalist constraints. They
show the virtues of more pragmatic, practical political debates which do not drastically
reduce the complexities and contingencies of the ‘muddy’ real world and thus stimulate
that abstract ‘ideal theory’ gets tested in real cases.
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gers: the danger of “anything goes” eroding any meaningful conception of
moral constraints (morality would become toothless, unable to exclude
morally illegitimate practices), and the danger of insensitive, culturally
imperialist, secularist individualism masking as universalism.
Contextualized theories, obviously, are in urgent need to know as much
as possible of contexts. For rich descriptions and explanations of contexts
they have to learn from the social sciences, particularly from sociology,
anthropology and history. Happily, recent developments in the social sci-
ences are conducive for such a productive cooperation: strong structural
and evolutionary ‘necessities’ typical for theories of modernization have
been criticized and ‘contingency’, ‘path-dependency’, and ‘institutional
diversity’ are the new catchwords of a rapidly developing neo-institution-
alist strand. Rich comparative and historical studies of the institutional
diversity of state-religion relations, of educational and welfare systems
etc. directly relevant to our subject, are readily available now. And the
seemingly insurmountable gap between descriptive and prescriptive ar-
guments, between ‘is and ought’, has been bridged from the inside, par-
ticularly by rapidly growing policy-evaluation analysis and the evaluation
of institutional settings. It seems as if political philosophy and the social sci-
ences would be more open now for a productive cooperation urgently
needed to overcome the institutional sterility of a historically and empiri-
cally badly informed political philosophy specialized in principles and
ideal models.
The authors in this volume try to contribute to such an institutionalist
turn in the political philosophy of the relationship between religions and
politics. They acknowledge the fact of moral pluralism and the necessity
for hard trade-offs and fair balances (Rosenblum, 2000, p. 7), the fact of
under-determinacy of principles and “interpretive pluralism” (Rosenblum,
2000, p. 7f.), and the fact of the diversity of existing constitutional, legal
and institutional arrangements which together require a new type of po-
litical theory combining sober thinking in the social sciences with norma-
tive theory trying to spell out the moral limits of legitimate variety of these
arrangements (p. 4, 22; see also Parekh, 2000).
Nancy Rosenblum’s “Religious Parties, Religious Political Identity, and
the Cold Shoulder of Liberal Democratic Thought” explores why politi-
cal theorists have paid scant attention to religious parties, an astonishing
fact in light of recent discussions of “value pluralism” and “identity poli-
tics” in culturally diverse societies. Drawing on historians and political
scientists she shows that religious parties have played and continue to play
an important role not just in expressing but also in constructing and mobi-
lizing political identity. Contrary to widespread fears – shared by most
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political theorists – religious parties are not always intransigently ideo-
logical, militant, extremist, authoritarian, anti-modernist, and a threat to
political stability. Historically, they often contributed to integrate strong
believers into liberal-democratic polities and, eventually, even to liberal-
ize and democratize conservative churches. Liberal democratic theory
neglects this “democratic acculturation” and reproduces a “radical disjunc-
ture between social science and the working assumptions of political
theory” also for normative reasons. Liberal universalists defend notions
of “public reason” more or less severely excluding religious arguments.
Liberal theorists of ‘difference’, ‘recognition’, and ‘identity politics’ rarely
“attend to religious political identity, its representation and organization
– much less parties and partisanship. The democratic context of the poli-
tics of difference falls from view”. And even deliberative democrats re-
produce this “politics without parties”. Rosenblum’s whole article reminds
us “of the normative and political reasons why liberal democratic theo-
rists should reconsider their disinterest, indeed aversion to religious par-
ties and religious political identity”.
Veit Bader’s “Religions and States” also aims at overcoming this radi-
cal disjuncture between social sciences and political philosophy. The huge
institutional variety of relations between states and (organized) religions
should be acknowledged in our practical evaluations of existing and al-
ternative models instead of assuming that an idealized version of “strict
separationism” would work best in all contexts. I try to show why demo-
cratic religious institutional pluralism in general, “non-constitutional plu-
ralism” in particular, may help to achieve higher degrees of relational
neutrality and more fairness, and I try to refute objections – shared by most
liberals – that providing (organized) religions a fair amount of autonomy
and of institutionalized participation in the political process would be in-
compatible with liberal democracy, would lead to stigmatization, strengthen
undemocratic organizations and conservative or authoritarian leaders, and
would undermine social cohesion, political stability and unity. Like Ros-
enblum I draw on historical and comparative studies of religious schools,
religious care and social services etc. in order to show that these working
assumptions of liberal democratic theory have to be reconsidered. Con-
trary to the assumption that institutionalizing religious pluralism inevita-
bly leads to aggressive political fundamentalism, I try to make plausible
that democratic religious pluralism, particularly its most flexible variety:
associative democracy, provides the better institutional setting for fight-
ing fundamentalism effectively.
Lucas Swaine’s “Institutions of Conscience: Politics and Principle in a
Multicultural World” also tries to address the political dilemma’s in lib-
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eral-democratic polities and the theoretical lacunae in liberal theory posed
by religious extremists, particularly by theocrats “advocating a strict, re-
ligious mode of governance and rule by religious authorities sanctioned
by doctrine”. He shows that liberal political philosophy did not succeed
to provide acceptable reasons for theocrats to affirm liberal institutions,
and he proposes an argument from liberty of conscience in order to re-
dress such lacunae based on the “principles of rejection, affirmation, and
distinction”. Spelling out the implications of this approach for law and
institutions he offers tentative suggestions for a new international approach,
for aid and endorsement of theocratic religions and, most elaborate, he
proposes “Semisovereignty for Theocratic Communities”, a specific and
far reaching version of institutional pluralism. Compared with legal mod-
els of religious accommodation, ‘semisovereignty’ is better able to prop-
erly protect the religious free exercise of theocratic communities from the
corrosive effects of liberal legal systems. At the same time it avoids giv-
ing theocratic communities broad or unqualified legal sovereignty. His
hope is that these proposals help to cultivate “a more favorable disposi-
tion between theocrats and more liberal-minded citizens, both within lib-
eral democracies and in other regions of the globe”. Treating religions
respectfully and fairly may “help to quell discordance from religious ex-
tremists.”
The three contributions in this volume share some crucial intuitions and
arguments:
(i) An institutionalist turn of political philosophy is urgent in this field;
(ii) Political philosophers and theorists should overcome their general-
ized aversion against all forms and ways to institutionalize religious
pluralism;
(iii) Varieties of religious institutional pluralism compatible with moral
and legal constraints in liberal democratic polities, however minimally
understood, offer better chances to integrate religious extremists and
to stem religiously motivated political fundamentalism in its more
peaceful as well as in its violent forms.
Within the scope of this broad agreement, however, the authors disagree
on many issues, e.g.: whether it is advisable to criticize the identification
of ‘public’ with ‘secular’ reasons, as I have proposed, or to continue speak-
ing of “secular reasons” (Swaine, 2002, pp. 6, 8) or of second order secu-
larism (Rosenblum, 2000, pp. 15, 18); whether “strong separation of church
and state should be maintained even with a quasi sovereign innovation”
as Swaine thinks: “It is true that governments of many democratic coun-
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tries around the world do not observe separationist principles, but that is a
shortcoming of governance in those respective polities” (2002, p. 33),
whether we should endorse a more minimalist interpretation of sep-
arationism, as Rosenblum (2000) does (see above), or whether we should
drop the misleading language of separationism altogether, as I have sug-
gested.
Such conceptual, theoretical and empirical disagreements should be ex-
pected. They are productive if they stimulate clarifying discussions con-
tributing to mutual understanding even if no agreement can be achieved,
as has been clearly the case during the workshop “Should we institution-
alize religious pluralism and, if so, how?” in Amsterdam, June 29, 2001.
I like to thank all participants for their productive contributions and criti-
cal comments from which we all learned a lot. Even if we continue to disa-
gree we now do so in a more informed, transparent and reflexive way. It is
hoped that this volume also contributes to such discussions in a newly
developing field of research in which our articles are only first, modest
and limited steps.
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